It is likely, however, that operations are being conducted by individual leaders who are not necessarily in consistent contact with or reporting to bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. One such individual leader is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who reportedly is forging a formal alliance with Al-Qaeda that was virtually non-existent under the Saddam Hussein regime.
This faction is believed to have been responsible for numerous suicide bombings against Iraqi political and security figures; UN, US, and Iraqi installations; and kidnappings of civilian reconstruction workers.
The starkest proof that Al-Qaeda continues to pose a major danger comes from its continuing attacks. These appear to be concentrated in the Islamic world, suggesting that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates might be experiencing difficulty in penetrating US homeland security post September.
This new focus in the Islamic world also indicates that Al-Qaeda might now be more of a problem for Middle Eastern regimes than for the US government. Some attacks have been thwarted in Europe since 11 September; however, the 11 March train bombings in Madrid served as evidence that Al-Qaeda remains able to operate in Europe. There is a growing body of evidence that the US-led war in Iraq has not helped to defeat Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic movements but has had the opposite effect of swelling the ranks of Al-Qaeda and its ideological allies.
There are no certain methods for completely defeating Al-Qaeda and its associates. Resolving the causes that spur recruitment to it - including the Arab-Israeli dispute, the US presence in Iraq and the overall lack of representative political development in the Islamic world - would probably be useful, although not necessarily decisive measures against Al-Qaeda. The recent history of the Iranian-backed Hizbullah organisation in Lebanon, long regarded as a terrorist group by the US, is an illuminating example.
Deprived of a cause, a terrorist group withers away. Al-Qaeda would fare no differently if some of the root causes of conflict in the Middle East were addressed. The US is working closely with its counterparts around the world to track and freeze Al-Qaeda finances to deprive it of its financial resources.
One of the main areas of debate among US counter-terrorist policy-makers is the degree to which they should focus more intently on capturing bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, who are believed to be hiding in South Waziristan or one of the other tribal areas of Pakistan.
It is not even fully known whether the two men still exercise command over Al-Qaeda and its affiliates; there is evidence and strong opinions on both sides of that question. Pakistan has repeatedly denied that it was the architect of the Taliban enterprise, but there is little doubt that many Afghans who initially joined the movement were educated in madrassas religious schools in Pakistan. It was also the last country to break diplomatic ties with the group.
At one point, the Taliban threatened to destabilise Pakistan from areas they controlled in the north-west. One of the most high-profile and internationally condemned of all Pakistani Taliban attacks took place in October , when schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai was shot on her way home in the town of Mingora.
A major military offensive two years later following the Peshawar school massacre greatly reduced the group's influence in Pakistan though. At least three key figures of the Pakistani Taliban had been killed in US drone strikes in , including the group's leader, Hakimullah Mehsud. The Taliban were accused of providing a sanctuary for the prime suspects - Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda movement.
On October 7, , a US-led military coalition launched attacks in Afghanistan, and by the first week of December the Taliban regime had collapsed. The group's then-leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, and other senior figures, including Bin Laden, evaded capture despite one of the largest manhunts in the world. Many senior Taliban leaders reportedly took refuge in the Pakistani city of Quetta, from where they guided the Taliban.
But the existence of what was dubbed the "Quetta Shura" was denied by Islamabad. Despite ever higher numbers of foreign troops, the Taliban gradually regained and then extended their influence in Afghanistan, rendering vast tracts of the country insecure, and violence in the country returned to levels not seen since There were numerous Taliban attacks on Kabul and, in September , the group carried out a high-profile raid on Nato's Camp Bastion base.
Hopes of a negotiated peace were raised in , when the Taliban announced plans to open an office in Qatar. But mistrust on all sides remained high and the violence went on. In August , the Taliban admitted they had covered up Mullah Omar's death - reportedly of health problems at a hospital in Pakistan - for more than two years.
The following month, the group said it had put aside weeks of infighting and rallied around a new leader in the form of Mullah Mansour, who had been the deputy of Mullah Omar. At around the same time, the Taliban seized control of a provincial capital for the first time since their defeat in , taking control of the strategically important city of Kunduz. Mullah Mansour was killed in a US drone strike in May and replaced by his deputy Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, who remains in control of the group.
In the year following the US-Taliban peace deal of February - which was the culmination of a long spell of direct talks - the Taliban appeared to shift their tactics from complex attacks in cities and on military outposts to a wave of targeted assassinations that terrorised Afghan civilians.
The targets - journalists, judges, peace activists, women in positions of power - suggested that the Taliban had not changed their extremist ideology, only their strategy. We accomplished that objective.
Security Council estimates. How valid are each of these concerns? Although al-Qaida has fighters in Afghanistan, its ability to launch international terrorist attacks from there and from Pakistan, where the core organization has been based for almost 20 years, is limited.
Affiliate groups such as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula have conducted limited attacks, including a December attack that killed three people at a U. Indeed, in the past decade, al-Qaida has localized more, relying heavily on affiliates to keep its name alive.
Pressure from U. The global intelligence campaign has made it harder for the group to communicate, send its operatives to reconnoiter or raise money, or otherwise prepare to conduct attacks. The Taliban claims to have accepted this demand, and al-Qaida members also claim they will honor this even as they attack the United States from other theaters. However, Taliban leaders have lied about the extent of their relationship with al-Qaida in the past, casting doubt on denials about the future relationship between the two.
However, drawing the line at international attacks is logical for the Taliban. Since then, the Taliban has learned the cost of opposing the United States, and its leaders may recognize that keeping al-Qaida personnel as fighters but drawing the line at anti-U. The U.
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